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INTRODUCTION
In a passage cited approvingly by Don Stuart in his well
known treatise Canadian Criminal Law,1 the Law Reform Com-
mission of Canada, in its 1976 Report, cautions against the exces-
sive use of the criminal law power. Noting that the "criminal law
is a blunt and costly instrument," the Law Reform Commission
urges restraint in its application. As society's "ultimate weapon,"
the criminal law power must be used with the utmost restraint. It
is with this powerful warning in mind that this Article shall set
forth to present a brief comparative survey of the American and
Canadian constitutional prohibitions upon excessive criminal
punishment. Specifically, the focus of this Article shall be upon
the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution2 and s.
* Adjunct Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law, Ph.D.
Candidate, University of Southern California (Department of Political Science /
School of International Relations).
1. See DON SUART, CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 62 (4th ed. 2001) (citing Law Reform
Commission, Our Criminal Law (1976)).
2. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Hereinafter referred to as the U.S. Constitution. The
Eighth Amendment reads as follows: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fimes imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
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12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms3 (both of
which prohibit "cruel and unusual punishment") and their effect
on mandatory criminal sentencing4 (via penal statute) in the two
countries. Part I briefly explains the differences between the juris-
dictional application of criminal justice in the United States and
Canada. Part II of this Article presents and explains the American
Eighth Amendment approach to the constitutionality of
mandatory criminal sentencing. Part III of this Article presents
and explains the Canadian s. 12 approach to the constitutionality
of mandatory criminal sentencing. Part IV of this Article com-
pares the two national approaches and presents the underlying
argument of this Article, namely that if one's concern is the fair
and proportionate application of justice, then the Canadian
approach to reconciling the constitutional prohibition against
"cruel and unusual punishment" and the application (through
penal statute) of mandatory criminal sentencing is the superior
one. Part V of this Article shall explore the possible reasons for the
differing national approaches to mandatory criminal sentencing.
I. JURISDICTIONAL NOTE
The jurisdictional applications of the criminal law power are
somewhat different in both countries, a difference that must be
explained before a proper analysis of any aspect of the two
national systems can take place.
In the United States, it is the fifty states of the federal union
that generally possess jurisdiction over the criminal law power.
The federal government itself does possess the power to create
statutory crimes via the express authority granted by the neces-
sary and proper clause of the U.S. Constitution, and the implied
authority granted by the commerce clause.5 Such federal criminal
law is mostly employed to ensure compliance with federal admin-
istrative regulations, or to deal with interstate crimes that the
local authorities are ill equipped to handle,' and as such is limited
3. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 12. Hereinafter
referred to as the Charter. Section 12 reads as follows: "Everyone has the right not to
be subjected to any cruel and unusual treatment or punishment."
4. Quickly defined, a mandatory sentence is a sentence set by law with no
discretion for the judge to individualize punishment. See BLAcKs LAw DICTIONARY
1368 (7th ed. 1999).
5. U.S. Const. § 8.
6. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 2.8(c) (3rd ed. 2000).
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in its scope.7 The fifty states, unlike the federal government, need
not search for some express or implied authority to apply the crim-
inal law power, as it is accepted that they possess the regulatory
power' to do so.9 As such, each of the fifty states has the authority
to codify the criminal law in their jurisdictions and to adopt
whatever sentencing procedures they choose.
In Canada, s. 91(27) of the British North America Act 10 specifi-
cally allocates the criminal law power to the federal government.
Thus, unlike the United States with fifty-one different criminal
codes," Canada possesses only one - enacted by the federal Parlia-
ment sitting in Ottawa. Also, unlike the United States, Canada
employs a unitary (rather than dual) court system, with the pro-
vincial courts enforcing both federal and provincial law, and the
Supreme Court of Canada acting as a general court of appeal for
both federal and provincial law issues.
II. THE AMERICAN APPROACH
The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment can be generally cited as having two important fea-
tures: (1) it restricts the techniques which can be used to cause
punishment; and (2) it restricts the amount of punishment that
can be imposed for offenses. 2 Originally, the Eighth Amendment
was applicable only to the federal government and not to the
states. 3 It would take the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment
and its due process clause in order to incorporate the Eighth
Amendment directly into the various state constitutions. 4
As to the first feature of the Eighth Amendment, the caselaw
is fairly clear as to what specific forms of punishment are prohib-
ited. In the case In re Kemmler, 5 Chief Justice Fuller of the U.S.
Supreme Court, writing for the majority, held that while the pun-
ishment of death itself was not manifestly "cruel and unusual"
7. This Article shall not concentrate on the limited U.S. federal criminal law
power.
8. The regulatory power of the states is also often referred to as the "police
power."
9. LAFAVE, supra note 6, at § 2.9.
10. Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Victoria, c. 3, s. 91(27). Hereinafter
referred to as the BNA Act.
11. The fifty states plus the federal government.
12. LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 2.14(f).
13. But note that most of the states do have some sort of state constitutional
provision barring excessive punishment.
14. See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962).
15. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
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certain specific punishments were, such as burning at the stake,
crucifixion, and breaking on the wheel. 6 The Court enunciated a
test to see whether a specific form of punishment was excessive in
light of the Eighth Amendment protection was: whether the form
of punishment "implie[d] there something inhuman and barba-
rous, something more than the mere extinguishment of life."17 In
Chambers v. Florida"' the Court extended the list of prohibited
punishments it had enumerated in Kemmler to include the rack,
the thumbscrew, the wheel, and excessive solitary confinement. 19
It is the second feature of the Eighth Amendment (i.e., its
restrictions on the amount of punishment that can be imposed for
offenses) that directly affects mandatory criminal sentencing. The
path the U.S. Supreme Court has taken in order to ultimately
reach the rule it has today has been somewhat tortuous and at
times contradictory. In Weems v. United States,0 the U.S.
Supreme Court took the first tentative step in fashioning a test to
determine whether certain extended prison terms ran afoul of the
Eighth Amendment prohibition. The accused, Weems, was an
American official in the Philippines2 who was condemned to a
mandatory term of fifteen years of hard labor for the crime of falsi-
fying public records. Writing for the majority, Justice McKenna
held that inasmuch as the words of the Eighth Amendment were
not precise and their scope not static, the Amendment had to draw
meaning from the evolving standards of decency of a maturing
society.2 Given this view, Justice McKenna concluded that the
punishment that had been imposed upon Weems was in fact
inherently cruel and excessive in relation to the crime committed.
Justice McKenna's opinion, specifically its identification of an
"evolving standard of decency," came very close to reading a pro-
portionality standard into the Amendment that was previously
thought to only refer to the punishment at issue, not at all looking
to the actual crime for which said punishment was imposed. It
would take seventy-three years, but in the case of Solem v. Helm,23
the U.S. Supreme Court did in fact read a proportionality stan-
16. Id. at 446.
17. Id. at 447.
18. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
19. Id. at 237.
20. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
21. At the time a U.S. commonwealth, whose criminal law was administered by
the U.S. federal government.
22. Weems, 217 U.S. at 379.
23. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
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dard into the Eighth Amendment; and consequently fashioned a
test to determine whether a mandatorily imposed penal sentence
was so disproportionately excessive in relation to the crime com-
mitted so as to be "cruel and unusual." The accused, Solem, was
convicted by a South Dakota court for issuing a "no account" check
for $100. The crime was ordinarily punishable by a five year term
but under South Dakota's recidivist statute24 Solem, previously
convicted of six nonviolent felonies, was classified as a Class 1
felon and was thus sentenced to a mandatory term of life impris-
onment without the possibility of parole. The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed Solem's conviction, holding that the mandatory life term
violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. Writing for the majority, Justice Powell
stated that the "principle that a punishment should be proportion-
ate to the crime is deeply rooted and frequently repeated in com-
mon law jurisprudence," and consequently went on to directly
read a proportionality standard into the Eighth Amendment, stat-
ing that the Amendment prohibited "not only barbaric punish-
ments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime
committed."2 Justice Powell based his holding on the view that
the framers of the Eighth Amendment had intended to incorpo-
rate into the Amendment all of the common-law principles of pun-
ishment up to that point, including the view found in the 1688
English Bill of Rights,26 that punishment required a principle of
proportionality.27 Justice Powell went on to fashion the following
3-prong test, to be used in order to determine whether a prison
sentence violated the new proportionality standard found in the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment:
In sum, a court's proportionality analysis under the
Eighth Amendment should be guided by objective criteria,
including (i) the gravity of the offense ... (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and
(iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same
crime in other jurisdictions.2"
Justice Powell's reading of a proportionality standard into the
Eighth Amendment prohibition would have far reaching effects
24. S.D. Codified Laws § 22-6-1(7) (Supp. 1982).
25. Solem, 463 U.S. at 284.
26. See Bill of Rights, (Eng.), I Will. & Mar., sess. 2, c. 2.
27. Solem, 463 U.S. at 285-286.
28. Id. at 292.
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upon the application of mandatory criminal sentencing (through
penal statute) in the United States. For the first time in American
jurisprudence there was a clear enunciation that the Eighth
Amendment prohibition applied not only in reference to the pun-
ishment at issue, but also in reference to the crime for which it
was imposed.
Scarcely eight years after the Solem decision, the U.S.
Supreme Court reversed course in Harmelin v. Michigan,29 greatly
weakening the proportionality standard that Solem had read into
the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment. The accused, Harmelin, was convicted by a Michigan
court of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. Under Michigan's
mandatory minimum criminal sentencing guidelines, 0 anyone
convicted of possession of over 650 grams of a controlled substance
was automatically sentenced to a mandatory term of life imprison-
ment without the possibility of parole. Partially reversing the
Solem holding, a deeply divided U.S. Supreme Court upheld
Harmelin's mandatory sentence as not violative of the Eighth
Amendment. Writing a concurring opinion, which because of its
three-judge plurality states current law,3 Justice Kennedy stated
that the Eighth Amendment encompassed a "narrow proportional-
ity principle" which only prohibited sentences judged "greatly dis-
proportionate" to the crime committed.2 Justice Kennedy
narrowed the Eighth Amendment proportionality standard that
Solem had established because "the fixing of prison terms for spe-
cific crimes involves a substantial penological judgment that, as a
general matter, is 'properly within the province of legislatures, not
29. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
30. Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 333.7403(2)(a)(i)
31. See McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 316 (5th Cir.1992) (citing and
following Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin as on point and stating current
law: "By applying a head-count analysis, we find that seven members of the Court [in
Harmelin] supported a continued Eighth Amendment guaranty against
disproportional sentences. Only four justices, however, supported the continued
application of all three factors in Solem, and five justices rejected it. Thus, this much
is clear: disproportionality survives; Solem does not. Only Justice Kennedy's opinion
reflects that view. It is to his opinion, therefore, that we turn for direction."); see
McCullough v. Singletary, 967 F.2d 530, 535 (11th Cir.1992) (agreeing with the 5th
Circuit in McGruder and following Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Harmelin as on
point and stating current law); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72-73 (2003);
Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20 (2003) (both holding that Justice Kennedy's
concurrence in Harmelin, with its adoption of a narrow proportionality principle into
the Eighth Amendment protection against excessive mandatory criminal sentencing,
stated current law).
32. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 997.
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courts."'33 With such principles in mind, Justice Kennedy fash-
ioned a corollary to the 3-prong test enumerated in Solem. Now,
the first prong of the Solem test would itself act as a threshold
test.' Hence, if the offense at issue was a grave or serious one, no
further analysis would be necessary (i.e., one would not need to
look at the second and third prongs of the Solem test).5 Any
period of imprisonment would be permitted in relation to a grave
offense. If the offense at issue were non-grave, only then would the
second and third prongs of the Solem test be employed. 6 Justice
Kennedy did not specifically define in his opinion what constituted
a grave versus non-grave offense, and a survey of lower court deci-
sions citing the amended Solem test Justice Kennedy fashioned in
Harmelin do not shed a great deal of light on the separation of
grave or serious versus non-grave offenses. For example, lower
courts have not only held as grave or serious offenses multiple
armed bank robberies, 7 the sale of 0.8 grams of heroin,3" and the
violation of child pornography laws;39 but also misdemeanor theft °
and a first drug offense.41 The only common thread shedding some
light on when a court will classify an offense as grave or serious
has been offered by the 5th Circuit in Smallwood v. Scott,4" where
the Court held that crimes of violence and those non-violent
crimes posing serious threats to others (such as drunk driving, for
example) could be classified as grave or serious for the purposes of
Justice Kennedy's modified Solem test as fashioned in Harmelin.43
With the promulgation of the Harmelin decision, the law in
the United States concerning the Eighth Amendment and its
effect upon mandatory criminal sentencing (in its current form)
was set. The 3-prong Solem test was kept but drastically altered,
with Harmelin transforming the first prong into a threshold test.
Although the standard of proportionality was not completely read
out of the Eighth Amendment by Harmelin, its scope was greatly
narrowed. In that Harmelin transformed the first prong of the
Solem test into a threshold test, if an offense was subsequently
33. Id. at 997 (quoting, in part, Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 275-276 (1980).
34. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 1004-1005.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. U.S. v. Marks, 209 F.3d 577, 583 (6th Cir. 2000).
38. U.S. v. Frisby, 258 F.3d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 2001).
39. U.S. v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 250 (3d Cir. 2006).
40. Smallwood v. Scott, 73 F.3d 1343, 1346-47 (5th Cir. 1996).
41. Henderson v. Norris, 258 F.3d 706, 710-11 (8th Cir. 2001).
42. Smallwood, 73 F.3d 1343.
43. Id. at 1347-1348.
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classified as grave or serious, then any length of imprisonment
could be justified.
III. THE CANADIAN APPROACH
The s. 12 prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment is
fairly new to the Canadian scene, the Canadian Charter of Rights
and Freedoms" only coming into force in 1982. This reality aside,
however, almost from the very first day of its enactment, s. 12 has
become the subject of much litigation - especially in regards to its
effect upon mandatory criminal sentencing (through penal stat-
ute) in Canada.
The Supreme Court of Canada has held that the phrase "cruel
and unusual" in relation to s. 12 is conjunctive in its meaning.45 A
punishment therefore must be both cruel as well as unusual if it is
to violate s. 12 of the Charter. The initial test as to whether a pun-
ishment was both cruel and unusual was first enumerated in the
case of R. v. Smith." The accused, Smith, was apprehended while
trying to re-entering Canada from Bolivia (where he had vaca-
tioned), with 7.5 ounces of cocaine. Under s. 5(1) of Canada's Nar-
cotic Control Act,47 anyone convicted of importing any type of
narcotic into the country was automatically sentenced to a
mandatory minimum term of seven years imprisonment. The
Supreme Court of Canada reversed Smith's conviction, holding
that the mandatory prison term he had been sentenced to violated
the s. 12 prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. The
majority opinions classified as cruel and unusual any punishment
"so excessive as to outrage the standards of decency."48 Certain
methods of punishment such as the rack, the thumbscrew, the
stocks, torture of any kind, and long periods of solitary confine-
ment were classified as always being cruel and unusual, and thus
always violative of s. 12." This approach was quite similar to the
U.S. Supreme Court's reasoning in In re Kemmler. ° Other punish-
ments, such as mandatory minimum sentences, could "outrage the
44. Hereinafter referred to as the Charter.
45. See the pre-Charter case of R v. Miller and Cockriell [19771 2 S.C.R 680, 689-
690. Subsequently, the opinion expressed here in relation to s. 2(b) of the legislatively
(as opposed to constitutionally) entrenched Canadian Bill of Rights was accepted in
relation to s. 12 of the constitutionally entrenched Charter as well.
46. R. v. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 1045.
47. Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-i, s. 5(2).
48. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R at 1072, citing Miller, [1977] 2 S.C.R. at 688.
49. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R at 1109.
50. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 436.
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standards of decency" and run afoul of s. 12 if they were "grossly
disproportionate" to the crime committed.51 (Note that the
Supreme Court of Canada here readily accepts the existence of a
full proportionality standard in s. 12, as opposed to the U.S.
Supreme Court with only accepts a narrow proportionality stan-
dard.)52 The test for "gross disproportionality" conducted by asking
the following three questions of the punishment rendered: (i) was
the punishment necessary to achieve a valid penal purpose; (ii)
was the punishment founded on recognized sentencing proce-
dures; and (iii) were there alternatives to the punishment
imposed.53 The above questions however, according to the Smith
holding, could not be asked bearing in mind the circumstances of
whatever case one had in front of oneself at the time. Instead, the
test had to be conducted under the hypothetical of the most inno-
cent possible offender.54 Thus, in the instant case, it mattered not
that Smith was a seasoned narcotics trafficker. His sentence had
to be analyzed by the Smith test under the most innocent possible
offender hypothetical (i.e. a naive young person returning from
vacation, not from the drug running haven of Bolivia but rather
from the U.S., carrying not 7.5 ounces of cocaine but rather a sin-
gle joint of marijuana). Under such a hypothetical then, according
to Justice Lamer, Smith's mandatory minimum criminal sentence
was indeed disproportionate to the "crime" committed:
[A] judge who would sentence to seven years in a peni-
tentiary a young person who, while driving back into
Canada from a winter break in the U.S.A., is caught with
only one, indeed, let's postulate, his or her first "joint of
grass," would certainly be considered by most Canadians to
be a cruel and, all would hope, a very unusual judge.5
The requirement that the Smith test be conducted using the hypo-
thetical of the most innocent possible offender, creates obvious
problems in relation to the application of mandatory criminal sen-
tencing in Canada. In the words of Peter W. Hogg, former Dean of
Osgoode Hall Law School (York University, Toronto):
The test employed in Smith was the test of the most
innocent possible offender: is it possible to imagine a hypo-
thetical case for which the minimum sentence would be
51. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R at 1109.
52. Solem, 463 U.S. at 277.
53. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R at 1074.
54. Id. at 1053.
55. Id.
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grossly disproportionate? It does not matter that the hypo-
thetical case has never arisen, and is never likely to arise
having regard to police and prosecutorial discretion. Nor
does it matter that the minimum sentence is appropriate
(or too low) for the offender actually before the Court. A
McIntyre J. pointed out in dissent, the decision in effect
entrenches the discretion of the sentencing judge to take
account of all the circumstances of the offender and of the
offence.56
Indeed, it seemed that Smith had in effect condemned the applica-
tion of any and all mandatory criminal sentences as cruel and
unusual in relation to s. 12 of the Charter.
Only four years after the Smith decision, Supreme Court of
Canada reversed course and placed several restrictions upon
Smith's requirement that the Smith test be conducted under the
hypothetical of the most innocent possible offender. In R v. Goltz,57
the accused, Goltz, was sentenced to a mandatory term of seven
days imprisonment for driving with a suspended license" - a
license that was suspended because he had accumulated numer-
ous driving infractions. The County Court of British Columbia, fol-
lowing the reasoning of Smith, applied the three part Smith test
under the hypothetical of the most innocent possible offender: a
person with a suspended license who had driven a vehicle a few
feet off the highway because its original driver had become dis-
abled, a simple good Samaritan - as such Goltz's conviction was
reversed as being in violation of the s. 12 prohibition. 9 Goltz had
in fact driven with a suspended license not just for a few feet and
not in order to help anyone, but rather over an extended period of
time, due to the simple reason that he did not want to give up the
convenience of driving. The Supreme Court of Canada reversed
the lower courts ruling and upheld the original conviction. Writing
for the majority, Justice Gonthier, while not expressly over-ruling
the most innocent possible offender hypothetical requirement of
Smith, held instead that such hypotheticals had to be reasonable:
A reasonable hypothetical example is one which is not
far-fetched or only marginally imaginable as a live possibil-
ity. While the Court is unavoidably required to consider
factual patterns other than that presented by the respon-
dent's case, this is not a license to invalidate statutes on the
56. PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 53.4 (5th ed. 2006).
57. R v. Goltz, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 485.
58. Motor Vehicle Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, c. 288, s. 88(1)(c).
59. Goltz, [1991] 3 S.C.R. at 530.
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basis of remote or extreme examples.. .The applicable stan-
dard must focus on imaginable circumstances which could
commonly arise in day-to-day life.6°
Though not expressly overruling the hypothetical requirement of
Smith, Goltz does allow some sanity back into the process by
requiring that any formulated hypotheticals not be obscenely far
fetched and ill related to the case at hand. The practical result of
Goltz, with its relaxation of the Smith most innocent possible
offender hypothetical requirement, was to allow for a return of
mandatory criminal sentencing into Canadian jurisprudence.
With the promulgation of the Goltz decision, the law in
Canada concerning s. 12 and its effect upon mandatory criminal
sentencing (in its current form) was set. The three part Smith test
remained, but the requirement that the test be performed under
the hypothetical of the most innocent possible offender was
replaced with the requirement that the hypothetical be "reasona-
ble" and not "far-fetched."61
IV. CONTRASTS BETWEEN THE Two NATIONAL APPROACHES
While both systems employ complex tests in order to deter-
mine proportionality, the Supreme Court of Canada seemingly
has had a much easier time of accepting the existence of a propor-
tionality standard within s. 12 than has the U.S. Supreme Court
of accepting a proportionality standard within the Eighth Amend-
ment. The result is a Canadian approach that is much more flexi-
ble in the application of its employed test than is the American
approach; and a Canadian test that is much more focused upon
analyzing the actual punishment imposed. Also, because of the
existence of the s. 1 over-ride62 found in the Charter, s. 12 protec-
tions are not diluted via balancing state interests with the right,
unlike United States' approach.63
In the United States, because of the Harmelin holding, if a
crime is found to be grave or serious (i.e., involving violence or
posing a serious threat to others), there is no further analysis
under the Solem rule - any sentence can be imposed. Conse-
60. Id. at 515.
61. Id.
62. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 1. Section 1
reads as follows: "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the
rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by
law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."
63. DON STUART, CHARTER JUSTICE IN CANADIAN CRIMINAL LAW 398 (3rd ed. 2001).
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quently, the states have largely been left to their own devices. It is
largely due to this important fact that in California, under that
state's "three strikes" mandatory criminal sentencing scheme,
repeat offenders have been sentenced to terms of life imprison-
ment for crimes such as the petty theft of $100, or for the stealing
of food.' In Canada however, not only is the full test preformed in
every instance, but there is a specific requirement that a "reasona-
ble" hypothetical be employed instead of the exact facts, thus
allowing for mitigating circumstances to be taken into account by
the trial judge.
There are also important differences to note between the
actual three prongs/parts of the two tests employed by the two
national courts. The American Solem 3-prong test requires only:
(i) a judgment regarding the gravity of the offense; (ii) an
intrajurisdictional test; and (iii) an interjurisdictional test." There
is no determination or analysis in regards to the actual sentence
imposed, but rather the analysis turns its full focus on what the
punishments for similar crimes are in the same jurisdiction (the
second prong of the Solem test), and in other jurisdictions (the
third prong of the Solem test). If a jurisdiction is applying
(through penal statute) a mandatory criminal sentence (for a cer-
tain crime) that may be overly harsh (in regards to said certain
crime), what is the point of conducting an intrajurisdictional test
(the second prong of the Solem test)? Is there not a reasonably
good chance that the jurisdiction in question is applying the overly
harsh mandatory criminal sentence across the board? Also, what
kind of a safeguard is an interjurisdictional test? In the United
States, with fifty-one different criminal codes, one can surely find
several different jurisdictions that might perhaps be analogously
applying (through penal statute) an overly harsh mandatory crim-
inal sentence for a certain crime. Unlike the American Solem test,
the Canadian Smith test turns its full attention to analyzing the
actual punishment imposed. The three part Smith test analyzes:
(i) the necessity of the punishment; (ii) the sentencing principles
utilized to pass punishment; and (iii) whether there are alterna-
tives to the punishment imposed.6 Under such a scheme, propor-
tionality is much more readily evident. The very fact that the
64. Jamie Cameron, The Death Penalty, Mandatory Prison Sentences, and the
Eighth Amendment's Rule Against Cruel and Unusual Punishments, 39 OSGOODE
HALL L.J. 427, 433 (2001).
65. Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
66. Smith, [1987] 1 S.C.R at 1074.
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question is being presented as to whether the punishment is even
necessary (the first part of the Smith test) reveals a commitment
to closely analyzing the punishment itself in relation to the crime,
unlike the American approach which only seeks to analyze the
punishment in relation to other punishments within the jurisdic-
tion (the second prong of the Solem test), and outside the jurisdic-
tion (the third prong of the Solem test).
Section 1 of the Charter establishes that rights and freedoms
are not absolute, and as such it provides a limitation for certain
rights if said limitations are deemed to be reasonable and justi-
fied.67 A s.1 override works in a two stage process. Stage one
involves a determination of whether a challenged law limits one of
the protected rights in the Charter (i.e., whether the challenged
law constitutional), while stage two involves deciding whether the
limitation is one that is reasonable. 6 Thus, all of the rights pro-
tected in the Charter are not absolute, but rather subject to an
internal test of reasonability. The s. 1 override can be thought of as
the Canadian answer to the strict scrutiny test employed by Amer-
ican courts, but with one very important caveat that it works in
reverse. The balancing approach of the strict scrutiny test is
employed by American courts to (usually) over-ride the validity
(i.e., constitutionality) of a law passed by the government. In
Canada however, the s. 1 over-ride is used by the government to
attempt to save a law that it has enacted - to in effect override the
initial judicially determined unconstitutionality of a challenged
law.
The actual judicially crafted test used to determine whether
the per se unconstitutionality of a law can be overridden via s. 1 of
the Charter was enumerated by the Supreme Court of Canada in
R. v. Oakes.69 The Oakes test as two parts: Part one involves deter-
mining whether the challenged law is of such "pressing and sub-
stantial" concern as to warrant an override. ° Part two involves
the government demonstrating that the means they have chosen
are proportional to their objective. 1 Proportionality is determined
via the demonstration of a rational connection between the meth-
ods of the challenged law and its objectives, a balancing test
between the objectives of the challenged law and the effects of
67. BERNARD W. FUNSTON & EUGENE MEEHAN, CANADA'S CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 168
(THOMSON CANADA LIMITED 1993) (1998). See generally R v. Oaks, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
68. HOGG (5th), supra note 50, § 38.8(a).
69. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.
70. Id. at 138-139.
71. Id. at 139.
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those of its measures which limit Charter rights and freedoms,
and a determination that the challenged law limits Charter rights
and freedoms as little as possible.72
The advantage of the s. 1 limitation in regards to s. 12 is that
it foregoes the necessity of balancing state interests with the
interest in maintaining the s. 12 protections at the initial inquiry.
The interests of the state are left to a second distinct s. 1 inquiry,
separate from the s. 12 analysis. In the United States, state inter-
ests in the utility and necessity of punishment must be balanced
with the legitimate interest in maintaining Eighth Amendment
protections. In Canada, too, this balancing process may occur, but
never at the initial stage of inquiry. Canadian criminal justice
scholar Don Stuart explains the advantages of such an approach:
The advantage of the usual two-stage approach to the
Charter is that Charter protections are not diluted by bal-
ancing State interests at the point of defining the content of
the right. This is left to the s. 1 inquiry, where the State
must discharge a heavy burden of justification . . . Given
that the test is one of gross disproportionality and outrag-
ing public decency, it seems highly unlikely that violations
of s. 12 will be saved under s. L"
Given that it is highly unlikely that any s. 12 protections will ever
be overturned under a s. 1 inquiry,74 the Canadian two-step
approach seems quite advantageous if one's principle concern is
the equal application of justice.
V. POSSIBLE REASONS WHY DISTINCTIONS
HAVE DEVELOPED
A. Different Forms of Federalism
Unlike the United States, Canadian federalism does not
employ a separation of powers doctrine. Consequently, the
Supreme Court of Canada is much less deferential to the decisions
taken on the secondary level than is the U.S. Supreme Court. Def-
erence aside, with fifty-one different criminal justice systems in
the United States, it would be virtually impossible for the U.S.
Supreme Court to establish invasive review over all of them, even
if it wanted to. Scholar Jamie Cameron explains:
72. Id.
73. STUART (3rd), supra note 63, at 398.
74. To date, twenty five years since the introduction of the Charter, a s. 12
protection has yet to be overturned by a s. 1 inquiry.
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As far as the United States Supreme Court is con-
cerned, state jurisdiction over criminal justice poses a seri-
ous obstacle to the constitutional review of sentencing laws.
Accordingly, outside of capital offenses, the United States
Supreme Court has effectively abandoned the task of estab-
lishing sentencing standards to govern the policies adopted
by the fifty states with differing conceptions of just
desserts. 5
Separation of power concerns notwithstanding, the very fact that
the states possess jurisdiction over the criminal law power in the
United States has led the U.S. Supreme Court to cede large parts
of its oversight authority powers in that arena to the states them-
selves. 6 Part of the motivation behind this thinking has been the
American view that one of the principle advantages of federalism
is that it allows the various states to experiment with different
solutions to the same problem. In Harmelin of Justice Kennedy of
the U.S. Supreme Court noted, "marked divergences both in
underlying theories of sentencing and in the length of prescribed
prison terms are the inevitable, often beneficial, result of the fed-
eral structure.'77
As discussed in Part I, the structural administration of crimi-
nal law is radically different between the two countries, with the
criminal law power largely exercised by the states in the United
States, while in Canada it is exercised by the federal government.
The criminal law in Canada therefore is quite uniform, with a sin-
gle federal criminal code operating throughout the country. The
fact that such standardization is built into the system, with the
Supreme Court of Canada sitting as a court of general appeal atop
a unitary court system, can perhaps explain the Supreme Court of
Canada's invasive intervention into the criminal law arena. In
many ways, the Supreme Court of Canada can be thought of as
the equivalent to a state supreme court in the United States. No
one is surprised when the supreme court of California, a court of
general appeal, intervenes into the criminal law arena in that
state. Indeed, is not that what the court is there for? The uniform-
ity of the federally administered criminal law in Canada also con-
tributes to the fact that there is much less sentencing plea
bargaining in that country than in the United States.", Perhaps
this reality has helped to foster a greater trust in the discretion of
75. Cameron, supra note 64, at 435.
76. Id. at 446.
77. Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999.
78. STUART (3rd), supra at 63, at 67.
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appellate judges to administer mandated oversight tests upon the
constitutionality of certain mandatory minimum sentences,
instead of largely leaving the issue alone if the crime is judged as
being grave or serious, the reality in the United States under the
Solem test.
B. Canadian Tensions Between Parliamentary
Supremacy and Charter Supremacy
Canada, which inherited the Westminster system of govern-
ance from the UK in 1867, has been continually transfixed by the
experiment in model governance that was being conducted south
of its border, has vacillated between the two systems of govern-
ance - wavering between the Westminster system of an unwritten
constitution and supreme Parliament, embodied in the BNA Act;
and the American system of a written constitution with a clear
delineation of checks and balances between the various branches
of government, embodied in the Charter.
The framers of Canada's original constitutional document, the
BNA Act, specifically rejected the model of an enumerated bill of
rights on the American Model, and instead opted for a model that
would entrust the protection of civil liberties to the wisdom of par-
liament. What the framers of the BNA Act did set out to do, how-
ever, was categorize an extensive list of enumerated federal and
provincial powers. 9
The absence of a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights did
not cause much concern in Canada until after the Second World
War and the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights by the United Nations."° One of the earliest Canadian
advocates for an enumerated Bill of Rights was a young MP by the
name of John Diefenbaker, who in 1945 took to the floor of parlia-
ment calling for the adoption of such a document." In the federal
election of 1958, the same John Diefenbaker, as head of the Pro-
gressive-Conservative Party, made the introduction of a Bill of
79. This final point is important because it describes the origins of what would
come to be the only judicial review power of the Supreme Court of Canada prior to the
adoption of the Charter in 1982 -- judicial review on federalism grounds. Thus,
pursuant to the BNA. Act, the Supreme Court of Canada, prior to the adoption of the
Charter in 1982, did have the power to strike down either federal or provincial laws
for legislating in areas of competence reserved for the other level.
80. HOGG (5th), supra at 50, § 35.1.
81. WALTER SURMA TARNopoLsKy, THE CANADIAN BILL OF RIGHTS 12 (2nd ed.
1975).
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Rights for Canada one of the central planks of his campaign.82
The promise was a rash one, as the process for amending the BNA
Act required not only the consent of all of Canada's fractious prov-
inces, but a special act of the U.K. Parliament as well. Realizing
these obstacles, in 1960 the recently elected Progressive-Con-
servative government of Prime Minister John Diefenbaker instead
introduced a statutory Canadian Bill of Rights83 through a simple
parliamentary vote. The Bill itself was impressive, and had bind-
ing effect on all past and future federal statutes. Drafted by a spe-
cial joint committee of both houses of Parliament (i.e., the Senate
and House of Commons), it took to an extensive study of the enu-
merated Bills of Rights of nations around the world, 4 eventually
producing an impressive document that protected a wide range of
civil liberties, from freedom of speech and religion, to freedom
from cruel and unusual punishment.
Despite the impressive and admirable list of civil liberty pro-
tections afforded by the Canadian Bill of Rights, the document
contained a number of drawbacks. Most glaringly, it applied only
to federal laws, leaving provincial acts immune from its scrutiny.
Also, the Bill was unclear as to what its effect was on federal stat-
utes that violated its protections." All of these drawbacks, how-
ever, were minor compared to the simple obvious fact that the
Canadian Bill of Rights was not entrenched in the Canadian Con-
stitution in any way, and at the end of the day was just a simple
parliamentary statute. As a result of this inescapable fact, in the
few cases that were brought to the Supreme Court of Canada rais-
ing the Canadian Bill of Rights, the Court erred on the side of
caution, viewing the Bill solely as a tool of statutory interpreta-
tion. In the case of a federal law alleged to be violative of the
Canadian Bill of Rights, the Supreme Court of Canada utilized
the following formula: Where the right could be upheld without
striking down the federal law in question (e.g., the law was silent
on the point at issue), then the law was so construed and applied
as to uphold the asserted right;86 where this could not be achieved,
the federal law was upheld.87
82. Id.
83. See Canadian Bill of Rights, S.C. 1960, c. 44.
84. TARNOPOLSKY, supra note 81, at 12.
85. For a more detailed discussion see PETER W. HOGG, CONSTITuTIONAL LAW OF
CANADA § 35.3 (a) (1st ed. 1977).
86. See R. v. Appleby, [1972] S.C.R. 303; Curr v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 889;
Duke v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 917; Hogan u. The Queen, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 574.
87. See Brownridge v. The Queen, [1972] S.C.R. 926; Lowry and Lepper v. The
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The reluctance of the Supreme Court to forcefully apply the
Canadian Bill of Rights led directly to several movements to
patriate the country's original constitutional document, the BNA
Act, from the U.K., and incorporate a constitutionally enshrined
bill of rights within it."5 The first attempt, in 1971, failed due to
the intransigence of Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa who
objected to the proposed document's failure to give protections
regarding Quebec's jurisdiction over its own separate provincial
social welfare programs.89 The second attempt, in 1982, passed
due to the fact that the unanimous consent of all of the country's
provinces was no longer required for patriation.9 ° Regardless,
through a marathon session of negotiations, the federal govern-
ment was able to garner the support of nine out of the ten prov-
inces (the lone holdout again being Quebec) and submit its
proposal for patriating the Constitution to the U.K. Parliament,
which was approved on April 17, 1982 by Royal Proclamation. The
newly patriated constitution kept the BNA Act, but, amongst
other things, added to it a constitutionally entrenched bill of
rights - the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
With the patriation of the BNA Act and the advent of the
Charter, Canada made a cleared break with the Westminster
model, instead looking towards the American model of specified
and enumerated rights. This process however is not yet complete,
witness the s. 33 "notwithstanding clause"91 of the Charter which
gives the federal Parliament the power to override any Charter
protection found in s. 2 or ss. 7-15. Thus, Parliamentary
supremacy is still alive, to a point, in Canada. It is this tension
perhaps that can help explain the Supreme Court of Canada's hes-
itancy to blindly defer to any and all criminal sentencing statutes
emanating from the federal Parliament.
Queen, [19741 S.C.R. 195; A.G. Ont. v. Reale, [1975] 2 S.C.R. 624. Peter W. Hogg
comes to an identical conclusion in the 1977 Edition of his canonical Treatise. See
PETER W. HoGG, CONSTITuTIoNAL LAW OF CANADA § 25.5 (b) (1st ed. 1977).
88. Id.
89. TARNOPOLSKY, supra note 81, at 19.
90. See Re Resolution to Amend the Constitution, [1981] 1 S.C.R. 753.
91. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11, s. 33. Section 33
reads as follows (in part): "Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly
declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act
or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2
or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter."
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C. Different Societal Trends
Societal trends continue to differ between the countries, a fact
that can perhaps help explain the differing national approaches to
mandatory criminal sentencing. Unlike the United States,
Canada has abolished the death penalty. As such, the Supreme
Court of Canada need no longer deal with the question of the
death penalty when confronted with the issue of excessive punish-
ment. The U.S. Supreme Court, on the other hand, still routinely
deals with the death penalty in that context, a fact that Jamie
Cameron, may color the U.S. Supreme Court's viewpoint on the
Eighth Amendment prohibition:
[T]he United States Supreme Court's response to
mandatory prison sentences is entangled in the messy
jurisprudence surrounding the death penalty. As a result,
the existence of capital punishment has motivated some
members of the United States Supreme Court to reject the
Eighth Amendment's application to mandatory prison
sentences.92
Other societal trends could also be at work as well. The non-parti-
san Law Reform Commission of Canada has urged extreme discre-
tion in the application of mandatory minimum sentences.93 With
its criminal law federalized and thus centrally administered, as
was discussed earlier,94 in Canada such societal trends may more
readily be folded into the criminal law. Such an institutional real-
ity in Canada makes it much easier to analyze and, if warranted,
implement suggestions by outside watchdog groups such as the
Law Reform Commission of Canada into the criminal law on a
national scale. In the United States, on the other hand, with the
administration of the criminal law power mainly handled by the
various states within the federal union, such implementation, if it
occurs at all, is done on the more limited state level.
CONCLUSION
Though close neighbors, and similar in many regards, Canada
and the United States are quite different in certain areas. Cer-
tainly the administration of criminal justice must be counted as
one of said areas of difference. Though the goals and wording of
92. Cameron, supra note 64, at 445.
93. STUART (3rd), supra at 68 (citing Law Reform Commission, Report Guidelines:
Disposition and Sentencing in the Criminal Process (1976)).
94. See § I of this Article.
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both the Eighth Amendment and s. 12 are virtually identical,
their application and interpretation, especially in regard to their
effects upon mandatory criminal sentencing within the two coun-
tries, has been very different indeed. The United States would do
well to look and study the Canadian approach to reconciling the
constitutional prohibition against "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" and the application (through penal statute) of mandatory
criminal sentencing, for when put side by side to the American
approach, the glaring limitations of the current modified Solem
test in use by American courts becomes painfully evident. If the
ultimate goal of criminal law is restraint and proportional applica-
tion, then the current American interpretation of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on excessive punishment (in relation to
mandatory criminal sentencing) falls far short of that standard.
